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PREEMPTION IN THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY: A DIMINISHED STANDARD?
ANTHoNY E. SZYDLOWSKI*
How should the power between the governments of the
states and the United States be divided? The federalist structure
created by our founding fathers seemed to achieve an effective
balance,1 and the states' ratification of the Constitution tempo-
rarily remedied this controversy. Nearly 200 years later, a com-
fortable balance between state and federal government has yet to
be discerned. Today, the states retain much of their sovereign
power, but Congress, pursuant to its power under the Supremacy
J.D. Candidate, June 2000, St. John's University School of Law.
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-60 (1991) (holding that the Mis-
souri Constitution's mandatory retirement provision for appointed state judges did
not violate the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act). The Supreme Court
described the federalist structure contemplated by the Constitution, noting that:
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people nu-
merous advantages....
Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses
of government power. "The 'constitutionally mandated balance of power' be-
tween the States and the Federal Government was adopted by the Framers
to ensure the protection of 'our fundamental liberties.' "Just as the separa-
tion and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Govern-
ment serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front....
If this "double security" is to be effective, there must be a proper balance
between the States and the Federal Government. These twin powers will
act as mutual restraints only if both are credible. In the tension between
federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.
The Federal Government holds a decided advantage in this delicate bal-
ance: the Supremacy Clause. As long as it is acting within the powers
granted it under the Constitution, Congress may impose its will on the
States. Congress may legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the
States. This is an extraordinary power in a federalist system. It is a power
that we must assume Congress does not exercise lightly.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment
of the Supreme Court's Uses of History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809, 879 (1997) ("To many
eighteenth century American intellects, the constitutional division of sovereign
power into three branches, each corresponding to one of the three forms of govern-
ment power, was a beautiful intellectual construct....').
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Clause,2 may preempt a field of law, explicitly or implicitly. His-
torically, the Supreme Court has expressed a presumption
against preemption 3 absent a "clear and manifest purpose of
Congress."4
In the securities industry, the battle for regulation suprem-
acy is manifested by conflicts between the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) and state blue-sky laws. The SEC is a
regulatory agency created pursuant to the Securities Exchange
Act (the "Exchange Act") as a supplement to state blue-sky laws.5
Its primary purpose was, and is, to protect the investing public
by ensuring that investors are provided with full disclosure of all
material information prior to engaging in securities transac-
tions.6 SEC rules were traditionally subjected to the same pre-
2 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2. The clause reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.; see also S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values,
71 B.U.L. REV. 685, 722 (1991) (discussing the circumstances under which preemp-
tion is ordinarily found). Hoke notes that:
The power to rule that state legislation is preempted by a federal legisla-
tive scheme ultimately flows from the supremacy clause, which literally di-
rects that any state law which is contrary to valid federal law shall be dis-
placed in favor of the federal rule. The supremacy clause's impact, however,
is not limited to the conflict between a valid federal statutory scheme and a
state law; the preeminence of federal constitutional provisions, such as the
equal protection and due process clauses, over conflicting state laws also is
grounded in the supremacy clause.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
3 See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142
(1963) (stating that the doctrine of preemption may not be invoked in the field of
commerce unless either "the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other
conclusion, or... Congress has unmistakably so ordained"); Schwartz v. Texas, 344
U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952). The Court stated that
[i]f Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intention
clearly. It will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to su-
persede the exercise of the power of the state unless there is a clear mani-
festation of intention to do so. The exercise of federal supremacy is not
lightly to be presumed.
4 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (noting the impor-
tance of congressional intent in a preemption analysis); see also Douglas v. Seacoast
Prods., 431 U.S. 265, 272 (1977) (quoting Rice); R. Mayer of Atlanta, Inc. v. City of
Atlanta, 158 F.3d 538, 542 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1334 (1999).
5 See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
6 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). The Ernst court
noted that
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sumption against preemption as any other federal law.7 Recent
decisions, however, threaten to destroy state sovereignty in the
securities industry without the required showing of congressional
intent to do so. Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co.,8 exemplifies a re-
cent trend of faulty judicial analyses applying the Supreme Court
standard for preemption to the securities industry.
In Guice, the New York Court of Appeals held plaintiffs'
state law claims, alleging violations of common law fiduciary du-
ties, to be implicitly preempted by federal law.9 Specifically, the
Court addressed Rule 10b-10,10 promulgated by the SEC pursu-
ant to the 1975 amendments of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.11 Guice involved a practice "known in the securities indus-
try as 'order flow payments.' "12 The practice of payments for or-
der flow ("POF") consists of retail securities broker-dealers
sending their customers' orders to market makers in return for
monetary or sometimes non-monetary remuneration.13  The
plaintiffs in Guice included former retail customers of one of the
defendants, Charles Schwab & Co. ("Schwab"), 14 a " 'discount'
stock brokerage house [that], . . . charge[s] reduced commissions
for effecting securities transactions ... on behalf of customers
who have already decided upon what securities to buy or sell."15
[t]he Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) was designed to provide investors
with full disclosure of material information... to protect investors against
fraud.... The 1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors
against manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transactions
upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose
regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on na-
tional securities exchanges.
Id. (citations omitted).
7 See infra note 35.
8 674 N.E.2d 282 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1118 (1997).
9 See id. at 284.
10 See C.F.R. § 240.10B-10 (1999), SEC Commodity and Securities Exchanges
Rule, Confirmation of transactions. This provision requires a broker to disclose to
the customer, in a confirmation slip, whether the broker received any remuneration
in connection with the transaction. Additionally, the disclosure informed the cus-
tomer that more information could be had upon request.
11 See generally Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat.
97 (1975).
12 Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 284.
13 See id.
14 See id. In Guice, the New York Court of Appeals consolidated two cases into
one appeal, however, for the purposes of this article, the author focuses on the lead
plaintiff, Guice, and the defendant, Charles Schwab & Co.
15 Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 284.
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In Guice, defendant, Schwab, indisputably complied with the
disclosure requirements of Rule 10b-10.16 Nevertheless, plain-
tiffs' alleged that defendant's receipt of remuneration for order
flow was the equivalent of "kickbacks"17 and their failure to dis-
close such amounts constituted a breach of fiduciary duty under
common law agency principles.' 8 Additional allegations included
breach of contract, 19 violations of New York criminal law prohib-
iting commercial bribery2° and violations of The Martin Act, a
16 See id. at 287 ("It is uncontested that Schwab ... complied with the applicable
disclosure requirements of... rule 10b-10 on the confirmation statements... sent
to... the ... plaintiff.. .
17 Id. at 288.
Is See id. In Guice, the Court did not specify exactly which common law agency
principles were implicated in this matter. The Court did note, however, that the Re-
statement (Second) of Agency provides that when there is a conflict of interest be-
tween the agent and the principal, the agent must provide "advance disclosure ... of
'all facts which the agent knows or should know would reasonably affect the princi-
pal's judgement' whether to consent to the agent's dual role." Id. at 289. (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 cmt. a (1958)). Additional provisions of
the Restatement further illustrate the fiduciary duty that existed in Guice under
common law agency principles. Section 387 establishes the general rule that
"[ulnless otherwise agreed an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely
for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency." Id. § 387
(1958). Section 388 states that "[ulnless otherwise agreed, an agent who makes a
profit in connection with transactions conducted by him on behalf of the principal is
under a duty to give such profit to the principal." Id. § 388. Comment (i) to section
427, dealing with the time when a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty arises,
concludes, "[a] concealment by the agent of the fact of collection or its amount...
sufficiently indicates that the demand of the principal will not be met, and suit can
be brought by the principal without more." Id. § 427 cmt. f.
19 See Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 284. Plaintiffs claimed that Schwab breached its
contractual duty by not obtaining the best market price for the customer, most often
referred to as the duty of "best execution." The theory is that the market maker (the
party paying for the order flow), who is dealing for herself, looks for the best spread
(between the bid and ask price). This practice is, arguably, contrary to the interests
of the customer. See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
135 F.3d 266, 270 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 44 (1998) (noting that "[tihe
duty of best execution ... predates the federal securities laws... [and] requires the
broker] to use reasonable efforts to maximize the economic benefit to the client in
each transaction").
20 See Guice, 647 N.E.2d at 284; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180.05 (McKinney
1999). Section 180.05 provides:
An employee, agent or fiduciary is guilty of commercial bribe receiving in
the second degree when, without the consent of his employer or principal,
he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person
upon an agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence his
conduct in relation to his employer's or principal's affairs.
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New York statute regulating the conduct of securities brokers.21
Schwab successfully moved to dismiss in the Supreme Court.22
The motion to dismiss was based primarily on two United States
Constitutional grounds. First, Schwab argued that plaintiffs'
common law cause of action violated the Commerce Clause.23
Second, Schwab argued that under the Supremacy Clause,24
plaintiffs' other claims were preempted by Rule 10b-10. 25
On appeal, the Appellate Division reinstated all of plain-
tiffs' claims concluding that a common law tort action was nei-
ther inconsistent nor in conflict with the federal regulatory
scheme. 26 Thus, the Appellate Division ruled that preemption
was absent because "Congress had passed no statute dealing di-
rectly with order flow payments and ... the SEC had not prom-
ulgated any final regulations regarding the receipt of order flow
payments."27 The Appellate Division remanded the case to the
21 See Guice, 647 N.E.2d at 284; see also N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-c(6) (McKin-
ney 1996). This section provides:
Any person, partnership, corporation, company, trust or association, or any
agent or employee thereof who intentionally engages in fraud, deception,
concealment, suppression, false pretense or fictitious or pretended purchase
or sale, or who makes any material false representation or statement with
intent to deceive or defraud, while engaged in inducing or promoting the is-
suance, distribution, exchange, sale, negotiation, or purchase within or
from this state of any securities or commodities, as defined in this article,
and thereby wrongfully obtains property of a value in excess of two hun-
dred fifty dollars, shall be guilty of a class E felony.
Id.
22 See Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 285 (noting that the New York Supreme Court found
"plaintiffs' causes of action were preempted by the Securities Exchange Act of
1934... and the SEC regulations promulgated thereunder").
23 See Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 284. The Commerce Clause is found in the United
States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to
"regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian tribes"); see also U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (authorizing Congress "[tlo
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Govern-
ment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof").
24 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
2 See Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 284-85.
2G See id. at 285.
27 Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 630 N.Y.S.2d 317, 318 (App. Div. 1995), rev'd,
674 N.E.2d 282 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co., 524
N.W.2d 742, 744-45 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). The Appellate Division in Guice agreed
with the rationale of the Dahl court in holding that New York law does not conflict
with federal law, i.e., that no SEC rule specifically displaces state law with respect
to payment for order flow. The court noted that the Supreme Court standard forbade
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Supreme Court to decide defendant's remaining motions for dis-
missal,28 but the Appellate Division also granted Schwab leave to
appeal, to the New York Court of Appeals, for a determination of
whether the Appellate Division's modification order was proper.29
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appel-
late Division, and held that plaintiffs' state law claims were pre-
empted.3 0
The preemption analysis of the New York Court of Appeals,
in concluding that state law causes of action were preempted by
the federal statutory scheme, is flawed. An examination of the
purpose and background of Rule 10b-10, and a reading of the
legislative history of the 1975 amendments to the Global Ex-
change Act, reveals that state law causes of action challenging
POF are neither expressly, nor implicitly preempted under the
standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court. On
the contrary, Congress explicitly preserved state law causes of
action.31
This article is submitted solely for the proposition that Guice
was decided incorrectly under pre-existing federal rules and cre-
ated bad preemption analysis precedent. The author recognizes
that recent SEC amendments may very well preempt state laws
regarding POF, therefore Guice will be used solely as a model for
comparing the proper preemption analysis to be applied in the
securities field as in any other field. Part I of this comment pres-
ents the standard for preemption. Part II summarizes the Guice
ruling as background for analyzing how this decision, and others
like it, threaten state sovereignty in the securities industry. Part
III offers a correct application of the preemption test to Guice and
analyzes the mistaken rationale of the court. Part IV considers
whether the standard for preemption has indeed been dimin-
ished, how future cases might be affected, and what role the
courts should have in securities litigation.
a finding of preemption absent a clear manifestation of an intention to preempt by
Congress or the SEC.
28 See Guice, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
29 See Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 636 N.Y.S.2d 621 (granting defendant
leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals).
30 See Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 674 N.E.2d at 285, 288-92 (dismissing
the complaint because the Appellate Division's modification was not proper).
31 See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1994). This provision is known as the Savings Clause,
which explicitly preserves state law causes of action in the securities industry.
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I. PREEMPTION: THE STANDARD AS ARTICULATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT
In Guice, Schwab, the defendant, argued that plaintiffs' state
law causes of action were preempted by Rule 10b-10,
promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the 1975 amendments of
the Exchange Act of 1934.32 Defendant argued that enforcement
of plaintiffs' claims violated both the Commerce Clause 33 and the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.34 This argument could be
successful only if Congress, or the SEC, preempted state law. In
performing a preemption analysis, the courts "start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress."3 5 This is logical in light of
the fact that the SEC was created subsequent to the states'
request of Congress to form a regulatory body as a supplement to
state law.36
32 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994).
33 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
34 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
35 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (referring to the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934); see also Francis J. Facciolo & Richard L. Stone,
Avoiding the Inevitable: The Continuing Viability of State Law Claims in the Face of
Primary Jurisdiction and Preemption Challenges Under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 1995 COLUML BUS. L. REV. 525, 533 (1995) (noting three recent Supreme
Court decisions, Freightliner, Cippolone, and O'Melveny, which evince an attitude
that makes it very unlikely that the Court will find implied preemption absent clear
congressional intent). Specifically, these commentators noted that
[tihese three cases indicate that unless preemption is clearly expressed in
the statutory scheme, state law will not be preempted. If the securities
industry wants to be subject exclusively or primarily to uniform federal
law.., there is a clear need to lobby Congress... and the SEC... to
clearly enunciate the preemptive scope of the federal securities laws and
SEC rules and regulations.
Id. at 538. "Historically, the Supreme Court [in its role as interpreter] has applied a
presumption against preemption." Id. at 533.
36 See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Legitimacy in the Securities Industry: The
Role of Merit Regulation, 53 BROOK L. REV. 129, 132 (1987). Warren stated that
Itihe states' role in providing investor protection was not a "me too" re-
sponse to federal regulation. When Congress adopted the 1933 Act, every
state but Nevada had enacted blue-sky laws during the preceding twenty
years. Because of an unprecedented deluge of worthless securities offerings
in the 1920s and jurisdictional limitations on enforcement, state securities
administrators asked Congress for a "supplemental" federal law to fill the
gap in their preexisting regulatory schemes.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Preemption can be found in a variety of situations. Con-
gress may expressly preempt state law, which does not automati-
cally foreclose a finding against preemption,37 or, as was found in
Guice,38 preemption may be implied. Implied preemption can oc-
cur in two ways: one, when conflicts between state and federal
law render compliance with both impossible, 39 or, two, when state
law frustrates the purpose of Congress. 40 In Guice, the court
ruled that state law frustrated the purpose of Congress. 41
The case law involving preemption by the Exchange Act is
limited.42 Available cases, however, indicate that there is no ex-
press field of preemption in the securities industry.43 In fact,
Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act contains a savings clause that
evinces Congress's intent to preserve state law claims.44 Thus,
37 See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (noting that
even when a congressional statute contains an express preemption clause, the statu-
tory construction must begin with the plain language of the statute to determine
Congress's intent).
38 See Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 674 N.E.2d 282, 291-92 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1996).
39 See e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963). Conflict preemption will be implied where "compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility." Id.
40 See e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Conflict preemption may
also be implied where "[state] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id.
41 See Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 291. The congressional purpose the court referred to
was the concept of a National Market System.
42 See Facciolo & Stone, supra note 35, at 538-39 (discussing three "discrete ar-
eas where a preemption.., analysis has been applied [in the securities industry.]
tender offers; control person liability; and the availability of damages other than 'ac-
tual damages for pendent state claims"); see also International Paper Co. v. Ouel-
lette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987) (noting that a state law is an obstacle "if it interferes
with the methods by which the federal statute [is] designed to reach [its] goal").
43 See Facciolo & Stone, supra note 35, at 538 (noting that the numerous federal
court cases pleading both federal fraud claims and state statutory and common law
claims are evidence that securities claims generally do not preempt state common
law or statutory fraud claims).
44 See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1994). Section 78bb(a) provides, in pertinent part:
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to
any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity;
but no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provi-
sions of this title shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or
more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of
the act complained of. Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of
the securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like func-
tions) of any State over any security or any person insofar as it does not
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the issue becomes whether, after applying the Supreme Court
standard for preemption and considering the savings clause in
Section 28(a), the Guice court correctly concluded that either the
SEC or Congress intended to preempt state law with regard to
POF.45
II. RATIONALE OF THE COURT
In reversing the Appellate Division, the New York Court of
Appeals concluded that plaintiffs' state law claims were "pre-
empted by the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act and im-
plementing SEC regulations."46 The Guice court found preemp-
tion, not in any particular congressional action,47 but in an all-
embracing concept referred to as the National Market System
(NMS).48 The Guice court, citing the Minnesota Supreme Court
case of Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co., 49 reasoned that more
conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder.
Id.; see also Warren, supra note 36, at 132-33 (noting that the purpose of the savings
clause was so investors would look to the states for protection). The author also
notes that of all the amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 over the
years, the savings clause has never been altered or amended. That is, until 1998. See
144 CONG. REC. H10266 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998). This conference report was issued
in response to S.1260, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. The
purpose of S.1260 is to reverse the trend of securities class actions being filed in
state courts in order to avoid the stringent requirements in the federal courts. The
Act proposes that Federal court be the exclusive venue for most securities class ac-
tion lawsuits. The Act is aimed at protecting employees, shareholders, and compa-
nies from meritless suits, where the company is forced to settle in order to avoid ex-
pensive litigation. The savings clause will be amended by substituting "[e]xcept as
provided in subsection (f), the rights and remedies" for "Itihe rights and remedies."
Id.
45 As will be discussed in Part IV, the major problem with the Guice decision is
that the rationale put forth in finding preemption applies not only to the primary
issue in that case (POF), but to all areas of securities regulation.
4 Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 285.
47 Cf. Facciolo & Stone, supra note 35, at 569-584 (analyzing application of the
Supreme Court's preemption test in two cases involving conflict between the Wil-
liams Act and state law). The Williams Act focused on the issue of tender offers. The
1975 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 addressed particular is-
sues but did not intend to effect a specific area of law, like tender offers. The general
purpose of the 1975 amendments was to grant the SEC authority to do what it
deemed necessary in order to promote competition in the securities industry by pro-
viding a level playing field that would benefit the consumer. See S. REP. No. 94-75,
at 2-3 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 180.
48 See Guice, 674 N.E. 2d at 285-86, 289.
49 545 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1996). The Dahl decision is, in effect, the lead case for
all POF claims. The Dahl court held that Minnesota law, requiring an agent to ob-
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stringent state requirements, concerning disclosure of POF, con-
flicted with Congress' plan for the NMS.50 The court held that
allowing a state law cause of action to persist would inevitably "
'undermine [the finely crafted and balanced Federal] regulatory
structure.' "-51 It is not clear from the Guice opinion why allowing
a state law cause of action to persist would frustrate Congress's
plan for the NMS. The court did not seem convinced with its own
reasoning. It cites to Dahl, which was based on impossibility, a
preemption prong never considered by the Guice court.52 The
Court of Appeals avoided any meaningful substantive analysis,
relying exclusively on the NMS argument for its conclusion. 53
Congress, in 1975, granted the SEC expansive authority to
carry out the NMS.54 Congress believed that it was in the public
interest for the SEC to take a larger role in policing the securities
industry.55 The SEC, under the 1975 amendments, was " 'di-
rected, therefore, having due regard for the public interest, the
protection of investors, and the maintenance of fair and orderly
tain the principal's consent before retaining any remuneration, conflicted with fed-
eral rule 10b-10, which requires only disclosure after the fact. See id. at 925. The
court agreed with Schwab's argument that complying with state law would be im-
possible because POF is determined in the aggregate to overcome the difficulty in
keeping track of the pennies per share that Schwab receives per transaction. See id.
The court deemed this to be a compelling argument. See id. Ironically, the Guice
court never spoke of impossibility, although it did acknowledge its agreement with
the Dahl decision. Instead, the New York Court of Appeals focused on frustration of
purpose. See Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 290.
50 See Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 289; see also S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 1-3 (1975), re-
printed in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 180-81. Congress's purpose for the 1975 amend-
ments, and its goal for the NMS, was simply to facilitate a more efficient market
place. See id. The main concern of the 1975 amendments was for the SEC to police
the self-regulatory organizations in the market place and to ensure fair competition.
See id. at 181. Nowhere in the legislative history will a reader find the phrase POF,
nor is there any suggestion that the SEC should rethink and restructure the
agency/principal relationship, and in particular, disclosure to customers. Congress
expressed approval of SEC actions leading up to the amendments, including the de-
velopment of uniform capital requirements, prohibition of commission fixing, and
assistance in the establishment of a national clearing system. See id. at 180-81. For
a similar description of the reasons for the creation of the NMS, see H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 94-229 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323.
51 Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 292 (alteration in original) (quoting International Paper
Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987)).
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 See id. at 286 (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-75, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179,
180) ("'[Tlhe SEC is granted broad and flexible authority to shape a new market sys-
tem adequate to the needs of investors in this country and around the world.' ").
5 See Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 286.
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markets, to use its authority under this chapter to facilitate the
establishment of a national market system for securities.' -56
This ideal included Congress's intent to promote economically ef-
ficient execution of securities transactions and facilitate greater
competition in the industry for customer orders. 57
The SEC, an administrative agency, deriving its regulatory
authority from Congress,58 exercised its power to promulgate
Rule 10b-10 pursuant to this grant of authority. Rule 10b-10 re-
quired a broker to disclose, in a confirmation, inter alia, whether
any remuneration was received in connection with the customer's
transaction.59 The Court of Appeals noted that, subsequent to
the promulgation of Rule 10b-10, the SEC consistently applied
the requirements of that rule to POF.60 The court drew support
for that proposition from a SEC release in 1993 in which the SEC
proposed to amend Rule 10b-10 to require disclosure of POF upon
opening a new account. 61 The court appeared to interpret the
6 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
57 See id. at 289.
58 See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984) (quoting
Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) ("Federal
regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes."); Guice, 674
N.E.2d at 285 (noting that administrative agency regulations, promulgated pursuant
to congressionally delegated authority, may also preempt state law).
59 See Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 286 (quoting Securities Confirmations, Proposed
Rule, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-12806, 41 Fed. Reg. 41,432 (1976)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240.10b-10, 240.IlAcl-3) (proposed Sept. 16, 1976)) (em-
phasizing that the disclosure requirements of rule 10b-10 were proposed by the SEC
as "a uniform rule applicable to all who wish to effect transactions for or with inves-
tors"); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (1977).
60 See Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 287. But see Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co., 545
N.W.2d 918, 924 (Minn. 1996) (refuting Schwab's argument that the SEC had ac-
knowledged that rule 10b-10 applied to order flow payments, because the NASD,
which is policed by the SEC, had notified its broker of that fact). The Dhal court
stated:
If the SEC had issued this notice instead of the NASD, then the express
preemption question would be a closer one. But Congress did not delegate
supervision of the securities industry to the industry itself. SROs are not
governmental agencies, they are private associations.... [Wihile SROs
may regulate, only the SEC does so with the authority of and on behalf of
the Congress. The fact that some in the securities industry may have con-
sidered Rule 10b-10 applicable to order flow payments has no effect on
whether the SEC intended it to be such. Neither Rule 10b-10, nor the
NASD Notice to Members, therefore, expressly preempted the application
of state law.
Id.
61 See Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 287 (citing Payment for Order Flow, Securities and
Exchange Commission Release No. 34-33026, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,934, 52,940 (1993)
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SEC's 1993 proposal to amend Rule 10b-10, and its adoption of
Rule llAcl-3, as acknowledgment that the SEC had exercised its
jurisdiction over POF all along.62 It seemed that the court simply
acquiesced to the SEC's jurisdiction and searched for ways to jus-
tify its ruling. The tone of the opinion was one of relief, as if the
court was pleased to rid itself of a complex securities issue.63
The Court of Appeals devoted two pages of its opinion to the
1994 amendments to Rule 10b-10 and promulgation of Rule
240.11Acl-3.64 The court noted that the SEC, after conducting a
study of POF, and requesting comment regarding the effect of
POF on the market, rejected a recommendation that the practice
be prohibited. 65 Ultimately, the SEC found that "the securities
industry gained economic advantages from the practice, which
ultimately benefited the investor public."66 The SEC's subse-
quent approval of POF, however, had no retroactive effect on the
facts of the case and was irrelevant to the preemption issue.
After its discussion of the 1994 amendments, the court fi-
nally examined the real issue: Whether the 1975 amendments to
the Exchange Act, and the SEC rules promulgated pursuant
thereto, preempted state law claims challenging POF. The court
conceded that under New York agency law67 and the Restatement
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240.10b-10, 240.11Ac1-3) (proposed Oct. 13, 1993). In the
same release, the SEC acknowledged that the practice of payment for order flow
'may be a breach of the duty owed by a broker to its customer and is not permitted
under general agency law." Payment for Order Flow, 58 Fed. Reg. at 52,938-39.
62 See Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 287.
63 See generally id.
64 See id. The court noted that the SEC had conducted extensive studies on the
subject of POF and found that the practice lowered transaction costs, created compe-
tition in the market and thus, ultimately benefited the public. See id. at 287. Fur-
thermore, the court noted that the SEC believed that requiring brokers to disclose
the exact remuneration per transaction would be unworkable and unduly burden-
some. See id. at 288 (footnote omitted).
65 See Payment for Order Flow, Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 34-
33026, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,934, 52,941 (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240.10b-10, 240.11Acl-
3) (proposed Oct. 3, 1993) ("These alternatives include requiring that payment for
order flow be passed through to customers; adopting a decimal-based system for the
pricing and reporting of all securities for which transactions are reported on the con-
solidated tape; or, banning the practice outright as inconsistent with the Act.").
66 Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 287 (citing Payment for Order Flow, Securities and Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-33026, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,934, 52,939-52,940) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposed Oct. 13, 1993).
67 See Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 289. The court stated:
Disclosure... indefinite and equivocal does not set the agent free to bar-
gain for his own account or for the account of a corporation which acts
through him alone. If dual interests are to be served, the disclosure to be ef-
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(Second) of Agency6s the plaintiffs might very well have won the
case because "no specific pretransaction disclosure of defendants'
receipt of order flow payments was made... which disclosure
might have affected the judgment of the customers."69
Nevertheless, the court held for the defendant, reasoning
that it would be unduly burdensome to require brokers to tailor
their disclosures to the demands of each jurisdiction.70 Moreover,
allowing states to impose additional or more stringent require-
ments, would "inevitably defeat the congressional purpose of
enabling the SEC to develop and police.., a national market
system."71 One may infer, therefore, that despite the savings
clause in the Exchange Act,72 any state requirement more strin-
gent than a federal law is implicitly preempted.
Plaintiffs' final claim in Guice, was that the savings clause
preserved state law claims in the securities industry.73 The court
quickly dismissed this argument and concluded that the savings
clause preserves state law claims unless state law conflicts with
fective must lay bare the truth, without ambiguity or reservation, in all its
stark significance.
Id. (quoting Wendt v. Fischer, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (N.Y. 1926)).
0 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 (1958). Section 390 states:
An agent who, to the knowledge of the principal, acts on his own account in
a transaction in which he is employed has a duty to deal fairly with the
principal and to disclose to him all facts which the agent knows or should
know would reasonably affect the principal's judgment ....
Id. The commentary to section 390 further states:
One employed as agent violates no duty to the principal by acting for his
own benefit if he makes a full disclosure of the facts to an acquiescent prin-
cipal and takes no unfair advantage of him. Before dealing with the princi-
pal on his own account, however, an agent has a duty, not only to make no
misstatements of fact, but also to disclose to the principal all relevant facts
fully and completely. A fact is relevant if it is one which the agent should
realize would be likely to affect the judgment of the principal in giving his
consent to the agent to enter into the particular transaction on the specified
terms.
Id. § 390 commentary at 208 (emphasis added).
69 See Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 289.
70 See id. at 290 ("Securities broker-dealers, confronted with the risk of nation-
wide class action civil damage liability... would be impelled to tailor their disclo-
sures to each State's common-law agency jurisprudence, and the carefully crafted
SEC disclosure requirements would have little, if any, influence.").
71 Id.
72 See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1994).
73 See Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 291.
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any other provisions of the Exchange Act or any rules promul-
gated thereunder.74
III. APPLYING THE SUPREME COURT TEST TO GUICE
It is uncontested that express preemption is inapplicable to
plaintiffs' state law cause of action.75 POF, until 1994,76 was
74 See id. (acknowledging that the purpose of the savings clause was to provide
the states with as much leeway to regulate the securities industry as the Supremacy
Clause would allow, and, in particular, to save state "blue sky" laws).
75 See Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co., 545 N.W.2d 918, 923-24 (Minn. 1996). The
court disagreed with Schwab's argument that there was explicit preemption stating.
It might be possible to read Rule 10b-10 as relating to situations involving
paying for order flow, but the language of the rule does not rise to the level
of a "clear and manifest purpose" mandated by the Supreme Court. Given
that there is also no contemporaneous commentary by the SEC indicating
that the rule applied to order flow payments, if there is any preemptive
force in Rule 10b-10, it is implied, not express.
Id. (citation omitted). But see generally Dumont v. Charles Schwab & Co., 717 So.2d
1182, 1182-85 (La. Ct. App. 1998). The court disagreed with other state court de-
terminations reasoning that the 1995 amendments to rule 10b-10 and the promulga-
tion of rule llAcl-3 proved the SEC's intent to preempt state law challenges to POF.
The court acknowledged that POF was not mentioned in any of the legislative his-
tory to the 1975 congressional amendments nor in the background or purpose of rule
10b-10 promulgated by the SEC in 1977. See id. at 1185. Nevertheless, the court
found that rule 10b-10 expressly preempted state law. See id. (demonstrating inten-
tion to abrogate state law effect).
76 In 1994, the SEC adopted rule llAcl-3 and amended rule 10b-10 in order to
preserve the practice of POF as well as provide the investor with greater protection
through more complete and timely disclosure. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (1999). The
regulation reads, in pertinent part:
Preliminary Note. This section requires broker-dealers to disclose specified
information in writing to customers at or before completion of a transac-
tion. The requirements under this section that particular information be
disclosed is not determinative of a broker-dealer's obligation under the gen-
eral antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws to disclose additional
information to a customer at the time of the customer's investment deci-
sion.
(a) Disclosure requirement. It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer to
effect for or with an account of a customer any transaction in, or to induce
the purchase or sale by such customer of, any security... unless such bro-
ker or dealer, at or before completion of such transaction, gives or sends to
such customer written notification disclosing: ...
(C) For a transaction in any subject security... authorized for quotation on
an automated interdealer quotation system... a statement whether
payment for order flow is received by the broker or dealer for transactions
in such securities and the fact that the source and nature of the
compensation received in connection with the particular transaction will be
furnished upon written request of the customer ....
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never mentioned in any SEC provision, nor was it discussed in
nearly 200 pages of legislative history leading to the 1975
amendments. 77 A finding of implicit preemption is similarly un-
warranted.
The court reasoned that the SEC, pursuant to the NMS and
its delegated authority as the agency responsible for
implementing the NVIS, 78 created Rule 10b-10 and the rule
applied to POF.79  The court continued, "the SEC, acting
reasonably within its rule-making authority, adopted a policy...
of permitting the practice of order flow payments and not unduly
inhibiting the practice by oppressive disclosure requirements."80
The court ignored the important distinction between permitting
POF and preempting a state from regulating that activity.
At least one scholar has noted that mere knowledge that the
SEC's policy is to provide full disclosure is not as important as
knowing why the policy is full disclosure.8' Similarly, in Guice, it
(d) Definitions ....
(9) Payment for order flow shall mean any monetary payment, service,
property, or other benefit that results in remuneration, compensation, or
consideration to a broker or dealer from any broker or dealer, national se-
curities exchange, registered securities association, or exchange member in
return for the routing of customer orders by such broker or dealer to any
broker or dealer, national securities exchange, registered securities associa-
tion, or exchange member for execution ....
Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. 240.11Acl-3 (1998), cited infra note 86.
77 See S. REP. No. 94-75, at 1 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 179;
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 94-229, at 87 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 321.
78 See David A. Kessler, Investor Casualties in the War for Market Efficiency, 9
AD HN. L.J. AM. U. 1307, 1309 (1996) ("Specifically, Congress granted the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) permission to preempt state investor protection
statutes that the agency believes would impede a national system of securities set-
tlement from operating safely and efficiently.") (footnote omitted).
79 See Guice, 674 N.E.2d at 290.
80 Id. (emphasis added).
8' See Dennis S. Kaijala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National Markets
in the Interpretation of Federal Securities Law, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1473, 1500 (1986)
(applying this theory to the issue of disclosure in tender offers). Professor Kaijala
expressed the importance of this notion suggesting that once Congress's purpose is
determined, it is the job of the court to interpret the provisions and apply them to
cases in accord with this purpose. See id. ("The crucial question is why Congress has
required such detailed disclosure in the tender offer context. Once that purpose has
been determined, courts should interpret the provisions, to the extent their language
permits, to effect that purpose."). Thus, the Guice court, realizing that the predomi-
nant purpose of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act is to provide full disclosure
to investors, should have found for plaintiffs as there was no preemption, nor was
Schwab's material omissions regarding POF worthy of protection under Rule 10b-10.
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is relevant that POF is not mentioned in the legislative history.
The more important question, however, is why it is not men-
tioned. It is submitted that the legislative history was devoid of
any mention of POF because in 1975 neither Congress nor the
SEC was aware of the practice. Thus, preemption of an unknown
practice such as POF could not have been within the contempla-
tion of the 1975 amendments.8 2 What is unquestioned is that the
securities industry was aware of this practice by the mid-1980s,8 3
and by the end of that decade, this practice became the subject of
extensive study.8 4
The court's ruling has done an injustice to the investing public as a whole by follow-
ing the irrational precedent set by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Dahl.
82 See, e.g., Orman v. Schwab, 676 N.E.2d 241, 248 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (Zwick,
P.J., dissenting), affd., 688 N.E.2d 620 (11M. 1997).
[Mly research indicates that payment for order flow is a fairly recent prac-
tice which grew up after the SEC's promulgation of Rule 10b-10 in 1977.
Order flow payments appear to have first come to the attention of the news
media and the National Association of Securities Dealers only in 1985....
It follows that payment for order flow by brokers could not have been con-
templated or specifically regulated in 1977 by Rule 10b-10 when the SEC
promulgated the rule. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 1976 SEC re-
lease asking for public comment on then proposed Rule 10b-10 does not
mention payment for order flow. Instead, the release explains that the pro-
posed rule is designed to deal with a quite different problem, namely, "with
agency crosses in the over-the-counter market where the broker acts as
agent for both the buyer and the seller."
Id. (citations omitted); see also Note, The Perils of Payment for Order Flow, 107
Harv. L. Rev. 1675, 1676 n.8 (1994) (noting that POF became recognized by scholars
around 1985); cf. Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co., 545 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Minn. 1996)
(theorizing that the practice of payment for order flow began in the 1960's and now
is widespread in the securities industry); Richard L. Stone & Jay Facciolo, Order
Flow Cases: Jurisdiction, Preemption and Securities Laws, N.Y.L.J., May 9, 1995, at
1, 4 (stating that the practice has a long standing history but has only spread to
listed securities within the past seven years).
83 See NASD Notices to Members, Number 85-32, 1985 NASD LEXIS 114, *1
(Apr. 30, 1985) (notifying members that the practice of payment for order flow had
come to the attention of the NASD and that any members engaging in the practice
should, at a minimum, comply with rule 10b-10. The notice advised the members
that the NASD had begun an investigation into the effect of this practice and mem-
bers would be advised further upon the results of the study).
84 See generally The Perils of Payment for Order Flow, supra note 82 (summa-
rizing the effects of POF and the studies of the practice leading up to the 1994
amendment to rule 10b-10 and the adoption of rule 1lAcl-3). This article analyzed
the arguments proffered to the SEC against POF. Of particular concern to market
analysts were "best execution" of a customer's orders and the structure of the equity
market (specific concerns included liquidity, public confidence, price stability, pric-
ing efficiency and competitiveness). See id. at 1678-83.
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In analyzing the 1994 amendment to Rule 10b-10 and the
SEC's reasoning behind the promulgation of Rule llAcl-3, the
Guice court misdirected its attention, as these rules have no ret-
roactive effect to the issues presented in the case. Since that
Pandora's Box was opened, it makes sense to look inside.
The court relied on the SEC's promulgation of Rule llAcl-3
in 1994 as if it were a ringing endorsement by the SEC in favor of
POF. The debates leading up to the 1994 amendments prove this
assumption false. In fact, SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, criti-
cized POF.8 5 The SEC, after considering many options, including
banning the practice, ordered a cost/benefit analysis of POF. Af-
ter analyzing the results, the SEC approved the practice provided
the customer is informed, at the time the account is opened, of
the fact that the broker may receive remuneration in connection
with the transaction.8 6 This indicates that protecting the inves-
tor's right to make an informed decision remains a priority for
the SEC.8 7
The actions of the SEC in 1994 do not confirm the Guice
court's theory that the SEC had preempted state law affecting
POF since 1975. Quite the contrary, it is unlikely that the SEC,
aware that brokers in the industry in which the SEC regulates,
85 SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt stated that payment for order flow may ad-
versely effect the market because the practice has the "potential to reduce competi-
tion based on published quotes." William Power, Order Flow Fees Continue at
Schwab, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1995, at C1 (internal quotation omitted).
86 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.lAcl-3 (1998). Section 240.11Acl-3 provides, in perti-
nent part:
(a) No broker or dealer acting as agent for a customer may effect any trans-
action in, induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, or direct or-
ders for purchase or sale of, any subject security.., or a security author-
ized for quotation on an automated inter-dealer quotation system...
unless such broker or dealer informs such customer, in writing, upon open-
ing a new account and on an annual basis thereafter, of the following
(1) The broker's or dealer's policies regarding receipt of payment for order
flow... including a statement as to whether any payment for order flow is
received for routing customer orders and a detailed description of the na-
ture of the compensation received; and
(2) The broker's or dealer's policies for determining where to route customer
orders that are the subject of payment for order flow ... absent specific in-
structions from customers, including a description of the extent to which
orders can be executed [at] prices superior to the best bid or best offer ....
Id. (emphasis added).
87 See Kaijala, supra note 80, at 1501-02 (noting that in the area of proxy solici-
tation, Congress believed that state law, when coupled with full disclosure, would
protect shareholders from potentially injurious acts of management).
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were practicing common law fraud, intended to preempt state
law claims, and yet, neglected to explicitly do so. A more plausi-
ble inference is that the SEC became aware of POF and the con-
troversy surrounding the practice and asserted itself on this is-
sue in 1994. Cognizant of common law fiduciary duties and
ignorant to the practice of POF, the SEC's likely purpose in 1977
was to supplement, rather than preempt, state law. This is so,
particularly in light of the fact that subsequent disclosure is ex-
tremely ineffective as a method of investor protection.88
The court failed to explain why it believed the SEC, a con-
gressionally created regulatory agency whose predominant pur-
pose is to protect investors by demanding "full and frank disclo-
sure",8 9 would suddenly ignore the savings clause and disallow
88 See The Perils of Payment for Order Flow, supra note 82 at 1685.
[Tihe vague, small-print disclosure required by Rule 10b-10 does not ade-
quately alert customers to the presence of payments for order flow....
[Elx-post acquiescence is not the ex-ante agreement that agency law seems
to mandate before the agent can keep profits derived from a transaction on
behalf of his principal.
Id. (footnotes omitted). In addition, the article noted that the confirmation statement
advises the customer that upon request, the broker will disclose more information
about the remuneration received. The author stated, "[tihis boilerplate is unlikely to
provide customers with the information necessary to enable them to make informed
decisions." Id. at 1691; see also Payment for Order Flow, Securities and Exchange
Act Release No. 34-33026, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,934, 52,937 (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
240.10b-10, 240.11Acl-3) (proposed Oct. 6, 1993). This reads:
Allowing post-confirmation description of additional compensation eases
the difficulty for broker-dealers of disclosing diverse additional compensa-
tion arrangements; however, this disclosure method may not effectively in-
form customers of factors influencing the broker-dealers' execution of their
orders. Unless a confirmation clearly indicates that payment for order flow
is received, the customer will not be aware that the arrangement exists,
much less that there is more information about the arrangement available
from the broker-dealer upon written request.
Id. The problem with confirmations is that they are received after the transaction
has been executed. This is contradictory to the purpose of protecting the investors'
right to make informed decisions. The NASD determined that its members' confir-
mations were not highlighting the fact that remuneration was being exchanged in
conjunction with the customer's transactions and proposed changes to the confirma-
tion to alert the customer. See NASD Notices to Members, Number 90-11, 1990
NASD LEXIS 425, *3 (Mar. 1990).
89 Lynn Katzler, Comment, Should Mandatory Written Opinions be Required in
all Securities Arbitrations?: The Practical and Legal Implications to the Securities
Industry, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 153 (1995). Katzler stated:
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), in response to the rampant
speculation, fraud, and deception in the securities industry that had culmi-
nated in the stock market crash of 1929. Although the Securities Act and
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state law claims. Nor did it offer much explanation as to how al-
lowing state law claims would frustrate the NMS. Certainly, it is
not impossible for brokers to comply with both the state and fed-
eral requirements. 90
The fact that a state's disclosure requirements are more
stringent than those of the federal government does not necessi-
tate a conclusion that compliance with both is impossible.91 The
Guice court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that compliance
with both federal and state disclosure requirements was possible.
It did not hold that compliance with state and federal law was
impossible, rather, the court reasoned that the methods by which
Congress looked to achieve its goals would be interfered with be-
cause brokers would not be able to avoid liability under state law
merely by complying with federal regulations. 92 The court stated
that "[ilt would be extraordinary for Congress, after devising an
elaborate [balanced regulatory] system that sets clear standards,
the Exchange Act differ, they share common goals. The federal securities
laws were created with two main purposes: (1) to protect investors by ele-
vating their level of sophistication through the requirement of full disclo-
sure regarding investments; and (2) to restore investor confidence in the se-
curities markets by instilling trust in their efficient and honest operation.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Jeffrey A. Brill, "Testing the Waters"-The SEC's Feet
Go from Wet to Cold, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 464, 466 (1998).
90 See The Perils of Payment for Order Flow, supra note 82 at 1692 (noting that
"disclosure is a low-cost solution that would not require a drastic change in the mar-
kefs operations"). The article referred to the solutions explored by the SEC prior to
promulgating llAcl-3, but this statement exemplifies the point that plaintiffs only
seek disclosure so as to make an informed decision. Many courts seemed to believe
that plaintiffs were seeking an outright ban because they were suing under state
law.
91 See generally North Star Intl v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578 (9th Cir.
1983). The court noted that although state requirements were more stringent than
federal laws, it was possible to comply with both; thus, there was no conflict. See id.
at 583. The court further noted that the state statute at issue was directed at securi-
ties offerings, while the Exchange Act of 1934 was aimed at disclosure. See id. at
582. Facially then, there could be no conflict, especially when Congress, in the Secu-
rities Act of 1933, specifically recognized the concurrent jurisdiction between state
and federal court. See id.
92See Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 674 N.E.2d 282, 291 (N.Y. 1996). The
court stated:
The stricter standards of order flow payment disclosure which may be re-
quired under State common-law agency principles inevitably will supplant
the disclosure rules of the SEC on the same subject and come to dominate
the relationship between broker and customer, since the broker would not
be able to avoid civil liability for acceptance of order flow payments merely
by complying with Federal regulations.
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to tolerate common-law suits that have the potential to under-
mine this regulatory structure."9 3 It is questionable whether the
standards set by Congress are so clear. Admittedly, the defen-
dant would be subject to different state law requirements. It
does not necessarily follow, however, that Congress's plan is frus-
trated or unreasonably interfered with.94
As the Supreme Court decided in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America,95 state law and federal law can co-exist, and a
finding of preemption is warranted only if state law frustrates or
makes compliance with federal law impossible.96 In CTS, the
Supreme Court decided that the purposes of Congress were not
unreasonably interfered with and that state law" further[ed] the
federal policy of investor protection.' "97 The New York Court of
Appeals also ignored the teachings of Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr,98 a
recent Supreme Court decision, holding that state requirements
more stringent than those of the federal government are not pre-
sumed to be implicitly preempted and, may indeed, co-exist with
their federal counterparts. 99
After analyzing the plain language 00 and the purpose of
Rule lOb-10,11 understanding the decision of the Guice court is a
93 Id. at 291 (quoting International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497
(1987)) (alterations in original).
94 See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 298-300 (1976) (noting
that even absent a savings clause, a state law remedy is not to be foreclosed unless
the state law was "so repugnant to the statute that the survival of such right would
in effect deprive the subsequent statute of its efficacy; in other words, render its pro-
visions nugatory"). The court further suggested that if a state and federal law were
not "absolutely inconsistent," then both may co-exist. Id.
95 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
96 See id. at 79. ("Because it is entirely possible for entities to comply with both
the Williams Act and the Indiana Act, the state statute can be pre-empted only if it
frustrates the purposes of the federal law.").
97 See Facciolo & Stone, supra note 35, at 582 (quoting CTS, 481 U.S. at 83).
98 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
99 Id. at 495.
100 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (1999). The regulation provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Disclosure Requirement. It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer to
effect for or with an account of a customer any transaction in, or to induce
the purchase or sale by such customer of, any security ... unless such bro-
ker or dealer, at or before completion of such transaction, gives or sends to
such customer written notification disclosing: ...
(7)(iv) The source and amount of any other remuneration... received by
him in connection with the transaction: Provided, however, That if, in the
case of a purchase, the broker was not participating in a distribution, or in
the case of a sale, was not participating in a tender offer, the written notifi-
cation may state whether any other remuneration has been or will be re-
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perplexing task. To accept the court's rationale, it is necessary to
presume that the SEC chose to preempt state law without clari-
fying that it was overturning historical and fundamental princi-
ples of state common law fiduciary duties. These duties encom-
pass the obligation of an agent to turn over any commission made
while acting on behalf of the principal and the duty to seek the
principal's approval before retaining any renumeration 0 2
Surely, the SEC would have explicitly preempted state law10 3 if it
intended to destroy a cornerstone of the agency-principal rela-
tionship.
The Dah'0 4 court, like the Guice court and all the other state
superior courts addressing the issue of POF, held state law
claims to be preempted, without clearly explaining how Con-
gress's legislative intent behind the 1975 amendments would be
frustrated. 105 The rationale of a few state appellate courts, con-
ceived and that the source and amount of such other remuneration will be
furnished upon written request of such customer ....
Id. (emphasis added).
101 See generally Securities Confirmations, Securities and Exchange Commission
Release No. 34-12806, 41 Fed. Reg. 41,432, 41,432-33 (1976) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 240.10b-10, 240.11Acl-3) (proposed Sept. 16, 1976). The purpose of rule 10b-10
was to facilitate the executions of transactions. Included in the proposed changes
was a requirement that brokers send a disclosure statement every month rather
than upon each transaction. Another main concern was for brokers to disclose to the
customer whether the dealer were acting on his own behalf or for the customer. It is
important to note that a dealer by definition is distinct from a broker in that a
dealer is not an agent to the customer. Dealer transact for themselves and of their
own volition.
10 See Kaijala, supra note 81, at 1488 (commenting that Congress is aware
when it is intruding on grounds traditionally left to the states and that absent an
explicit preemption of the particular field, a careful investigation of the Congres-
sional intent is required).
103 In light of the 1994 amendment to rule 10b-10 and the adoption of rule
llAcl-3, a much stronger argument can now be made for implicit, and even express,
preemption. It is quite likely that a court would find there to be express preemption
in the new rules as there is now direct language regarding order flow payments.
Furthermore, there is ample evidence, from the SEC releases and studies the SEC
conducted, to support a finding of preemption. Nevertheless, the SEC refrained from
explicitly excluding state law causes of action to be invoked in the area of order flow
payments.
104 Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co., 545 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1996).
105 See generally id. at 923-24. See, e.g., Orman v. Charles Schwab & Co., 688
N.E.2d 620, 622-24 (Ill. 1997) (noting that payment for order flow "easily" comes
under the term "remuneration" in rule 10b-10). The Orman court noted that the
duty of the SEC was to facilitate efficient transactions and promote fair competition
among brokers, and dealers, and exchange markets. Nowhere in the opinion was an
explanation of how these goals would be frustrated. See id.
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cluding that there was no preemption, is more persuasive. Gen-
erally, these courts concluded that far from frustrating the intent
of Congress, the additional disclosure required by the states ac-
tually furthered the purpose of Congress and the SEC respec-
tively.106 Moreover, three federal courts10 7 have considered the
issue of preemption in POF cases, and all three courts have re-
manded the matter to state court, concluding that there is no
federal jurisdiction. 08 This is significant because federal courts
are more familiar with securities cases and thus, are more at-
tuned to what Congress and the SEC envision as "their territory"
regarding preemption of state laws.
The Guice court also underestimated the importance of the
savings clause. Congress, by explicitly preserving state law
remedies through the savings clause, contemplated that inevita-
bly there would be dual litigation in federal and state court.10 9
The Supreme Court has traditionally viewed the savings clause
as "plainly intended to protect, rather than to limit, state
106 See, e.g., Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co., 524 N.W.2d 742, 745-47 (Minn.
1994), rev'd, 545 N.W.2d at 918. The court concluded that state law was not pre-
empted and that state law may indeed further the purpose of Congress and the SEC.
The court ruled that the state law requirements would not "frustrate the ongoing
regulatory activities of the SEC." Id. at 747. Furthermore, the court acknowledged
that while the SEC imposed regulation of payment for order flow in 1994, the fact
remained that there were no relevant, specific regulations at the time of this case.
See id. at 745; see also Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 630 N.Y.S.2d 317, 318-19
(N.Y. App. Div. 1995), rev'd, Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 674 N.E.2d 282 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1996). The Guice court agreed with the appellate court in Dahl and ruled
that there was no conflict between state and federal law. Furthermore, Congress had
never dealt with the issue of POF and the SEC had not yet promulgated rule llAcl-
3. Thus, state law was not preempted.
107 See Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 674 N.E.2d 282 (N.Y. 1996), cert. denied,
520 U.S. 1118 (1997) (noting that two Louisiana Federal District Courts and another
in Maryland ruled that there was no federal jurisdiction in POF cases).
108 See, e.g., Thomas v. Charles Schwab & Co., No. 95-0307-A, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12007, at *1-*6 (W.D. La. 1995). The court decided that the federal district
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because complete federal law preemp-
tion did not exist, therefore, there was no federal question presented. Thus, the case
was properly remanded to state court. See id. at *6. The court ruled that there was
no explicit preemption and that congressional intent to preempt state law could not
be inferred. See id. at *4-*5. Furthermore, the court ruled that the additional disclo-
sure requirements of the state did not conflict with SEC regulations. See id. at *5.
109 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 383 (1996)
(noting that in enacting the savings clause, "Congress plainly contemplated the pos-
sibility of dual litigation in state and federal courts relating to securities transac-
tions").
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authority." 10 Even Rule 10b-10, on which Schwab's claim of pre-
emption is based, acknowledges that the disclosure requirements
of 10b-10 are not exclusive."' After reading this provision, it is
hard to imagine a clearer intent to preserve state regulation. n2
The Supreme Court has traditionally been reluctant to find im-
plicit preemption of state law." 3 For example, Justice Scalia,
concurring in CTS, claimed that the savings clause should be in-
terpreted to foreclose an analysis of preemption based on con-
gressional purpose entirely, leaving the court to examine poten-
tial conflict between state and federal law." 4 The savings clause
has never been amended and in their appeal to the Supreme
Court, plaintiffs' counsel noted that both the Securities Act of
110 Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 n.13 (1979) (noting that
"Thomas Corcoran, a principal draftsman of the 1934 Act, indicated to Congress that
the purpose of § 28(a) was to leave the States with as much leeway to regulate secu-
rities transactions as the Supremacy Clause would allow them in the absence of
such a provision"); see also Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 674 N.E.2d 282 (N.Y.
1996) (pointing out that Congress never intended federal regulation of the securities
industry to preempt the States unless stated specifically), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1118
(1997).
111 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (1999) ("The requirements under this section that
particular information be disclosed is not determinative of a broker-dealer's obliga-
tion under the general antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws to disclose
additional information to a customer at the time of the customer's investment deci-
sion."); see also Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 674 N.E.2d 282 (N.Y. 1996), cert. de-
nied, 520 U.S. 1118 (1997).
Footnote 28 of the 1977 SEC Exchange Act Release accompanying Rule 10b-10
states that "t]he rule does not attempt to set forth all possible categories of material
information to be disclosed by broker-dealers in connection with a particular trans-
action in securities." Exchange Act Release No. 13508, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 81,143 at 87,930 n.28 (May 5, 1977).
112 Indeed, the Supreme Court had the same observation. See, e.g., Leroy, 443
U.S. at 182 ("The section was plainly intended to protect, rather than to limit, state
authority.").
113 See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142
(1963) (stating that preemption will not be found unless either "the nature of the
regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or... Congress has unmis-
takably so ordained"); Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952). The Schwartz
court noted that
[i]f Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intention
clearly. It will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to su-
persede the exercise of the power of the state unless there is a clear mani-
festation of intention to do so. The exercise of federal supremacy is not
lightly to be presuired.
Id.
114 See Facciolo & Stone, supra note 35, at 583 (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 96 (1987)).
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1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934 specifically preserved state
law remedies in cases of fraud. 115
IV. THE DIMINISHED PREEMPTION STANDARD, THE STATES' ROLE
AND THE EFFECT ON SECURITIES LITIGATION
The idea that a phrase, such as National Market System, can
be interpreted as preempting state law contradicts the Supreme
Court's historically stringent preemption standard requiring
Congress's clear manifestation of its intent to preempt. If pre-
emption were the intent of Congress or the SEC regarding POF,
it would have been simple enough to state as much." 6
The reasoning of the Guice court implies that the SEC is the
lone star in the securities field and state regulation is meaning-
less because any state law that differs from SEC rules or the
rules of other states, by definition, defeats a NMS approach.
Equally troubling is that both Congress and the SEC were silent
on the issue of POF. Congress has not conveyed any desire for
NMS to be interpreted as field preemption. Absent any clear in-
tent, state laws may both co-exist with, and be more stringent
than, SEC provisions and should not be preempted unless the
Supreme Court standards are met. In Guice, the New York
Court of Appeals lacked evidence of Congress's intent to preempt
state law and is, therefore, erroneous.
It is clear that the Supreme Court standard for preemption
was not met in Guice. The question remains, however, why the
New York Court of Appeals, along with many other state su-
preme courts, refused plaintiffs the opportunity to bring a state
law cause of action. One can only speculate, but it is this
115 See Petition for Writ of Cert., Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 674 N.E.2d
282, 1994 U.S. Briefs 5300, at 5-6 (Jan. 9, 1997) (No. 96-1105). The petition quoted
language from a recent amendment of section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933:
(c) Preservation of Authority.-
(1)Fraud authority.-Consistent with this section, the securities commis-
sion (or any agency or office performing like functions) of any State shall
retain jurisdiction under the laws of such State to investigate and bring en-
forcement actions with respect to fraud or deceit, or unlawful conduct by a
broker or dealer, in connection with securities or securities transactions.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1996)).
116 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996) (quoting Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984) ("It is, to say the least, 'difficult to be-
lieve that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse
for those injured by illegal conduct' and it would take language much plainer... to
convince us that Congress intended that result.") (citation omitted).
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author's belief that state courts felt uncomfortable dealing with
issues presenting federal ramifications. Perhaps, the courts were
intimidated by the subject matter of the litigation and felt that
the SEC was better equipped to handle this issue. Or maybe, be-
cause the financial stake per plaintiff was relatively small and
the burden on defendants potentially large, interference with the
authority of the SEC seemed unnecessary in light of the recent
promulgation of Rule llAcl-3 which, of course, was irrelevant to
the facts in Guice.
Whatever the reason may have been, there is no question
that the Guice decision struck a devastating blow to state sover-
eignty. What does this decision reflect about the role of the state
in regulating the securities industry? Eventually the state's role
will need to be redefined, perhaps by the legislature in the form
of field preemption or by the judiciary. After all, defendants na-
tionwide, faced with allegations of violating state securities laws,
will immediately argue that their clients' actions are regulated
solely by the SEC under the guise of the National Market System
and, thus, the claim is not actionable.117 Decisions such as Guice
and Dahl perpetuate this defense and subsequently create a
brand new preemption test not authorized by the Supreme Court.
Another case involving common law fiduciary duties which
helps exemplify possible inequities that may occur when a court
fails to administer an accurate preemption analysis is In re
Merrill Lynch.118 This is a securities case involving an alleged
violation of the duty of best execution. The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants were using a system referred to as the National
Best Bid and Offer (NBBO)" 9 to execute plaintiffs' trades and
117 Indeed, Guice and its progeny are effecting the outcomes of breach of fiduci-
ary duty cases and other securities related cases nationwide. See, e.g., Gilman v.
BHC Sec. Inc., 679 N.Y.S.2d 565, 565 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding plaintiffs'
claims "identical in all pertinent respects" to those made in Guice); Estate of Braun-
stein v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 657 N.Y.S.2d 12, 13 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1997) (in finding that preemption existed, the court cited to Guice as authority
for the proposition that when the SEC expressly regulates an area, that area is pre-
empted); Rosenfeld v. Bear Stearns & Co., 655 N.Y.S.2d 473, 473 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997) (affirming the trial court's approval of a negotiated settlement and noting that
in light of Guice, the plaintiffs had very little chance of success). Where can these
plaintiffs turn for relief? According to these cases, the SEC presents the only possi-
ble forum for plaintiffs as it controls all aspects of the securities industry.
118 911 F.Supp. 754 (D.N.J. 1995), rev'd sub nom., Newton v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 1998).
119 This system represents "the best bid and best offer of any OTC market maker
in a particular security on the tvo-sided NASDAQ market." Id. at 756.
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subsequently used alternative systems, such as Instinet and Se-
lectNet, to execute trades on their own behalf, thereby turning a
profit. 20
As in Guice, the plaintiffs here alleged that the defendants
violated common law fiduciary duties.121 The district court
granted a summary judgment motion in favor of the defen-
dants.122 The court ruled in favor of the defendant despite the
fact that there was no established industry standard and no ex-
press authorization by the SEC or the NASD allowing a broker to
rely on any particular quotation system in fulfilling the duty of
best execution.'2 The court also reasoned that since the SEC
was considering the issue, the court should not interfere. 124 Fur-
thermore, the court noted that requiring a broker to check each
available quotation before executing a trade could be a burden to
the efficient market. 25  Thus, the duty of best execution may
have to take a back seat to market efficiency. Is this the result
Congress envisioned when it uttered the phrase National Market
System in 1975? Is this the correct standard to apply to deter-
mine whether a cause of action exists?
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the order for summary
judgment, punctuating its disagreement with the district court's
ruling, stating that, "[ulnder the district court's logic, [the] de-
fendant[s] would be entitled to summary judgment even if it were
her regular practice to knowingly violate the duty of best execu-
tion, so long as she could identify a sufficient number of other
broker-dealers engaged in the same wrongful conduct ..... 126
120 See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d at 273.
The practice that the plaintiffs alleged defendants engaged in was confirmed by an
SEC study. Id.; see also Order Execution Obligations, Securities and Exchange
Commission Release No. 34-37619A, 61 Fed. Reg. 48,290, 48,307-08 (codified at 17
C.F.R. 240.11Ac1-4) (proposed Sept. 12, 1996).
121 See Newton, 135 F.3d at 270. The court agreed that the duty of best execution
has its roots in common law agency principles.
122 See Merrill Lynch, 911 F. Supp. at 756.
123 See id. at 770.
124 See id. at 773. The court's reasoning was similar to that of the Guice court.
The court suggested that the rapid evolution of the market place required the exper-
tise and attention of the SEC exclusively, and the SEC is the regulatory agency cho-
sen by Congress as the sole watchdog of the securities market. In other words, where
the SEC has spoken, a court has no business interfering with how the securities in-
dustry is regulated.
125 See id. at 770.
12 Newton, 135 F.3d at 274.
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Admittedly, there are valid reasons to continue enhancement
of the NMS. The court touched on one of them stating that tech-
nology in the market place is expanding at an exponential rate,
thus globalizing the market. 127 This is precisely the reason that
courts must narrowly interpret the provisions of the Exchange
Act and the corresponding rules promulgated pursuant thereto
by the SEC and subordinate self-regulatory organizations. It is
impossible for the SEC to legislate for every creative brokerage
scheme. The courts should play the role of gap filler by applying
state law to areas in which the SEC has not yet asserted itself, or
to those, which, although addressed, may be vague as to their
coverage, such as POF. Additionally, the courts should interpret
existing rules in a manner consistent with the legislative intent
of the Exchange Act. This would allow Congress's plan for NMS
to flourish while leaving the states' with some ability to protect
their citizens. The public, as a whole, benefits when courts work
in conjunction with the SEC rather than shirk their responsibil-
ity in the name of SEC expertise and autonomy.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the history of our country the judicial system
has struggled to balance the goals of Congress with the sovereign
powers of the states. The Supreme Court has formulated stan-
dards for preemption, and it is evident that absent a clear mani-
festation from Congress of its intent, the presumption is against
preemption. If there is no explicit preemption, implicit preemp-
tion may exist if compliance with both federal and state law is
impossible, or state law would frustrate the intent of Congress.
The Guice court did not adhere to the stringent standard set
forth by the Supreme Court. The court showed no evidence that
Congress's goal of a National Market System would be frustrated
by state law. On the contrary, state law supplementation
strengthens the purpose of protecting investors by requiring full
disclosure of material information. The legislative history of the
1975 amendments of the Exchange Act does not mention POF,
nor does it suggest that the National Market System was in-
tended to preempt state law. Moreover, the SEC did not mention
POF when it promulgated Rule 10b-10 pursuant to the 1975
amendments.
17 See id. at 271.
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By disregarding the plain meaning rule and substituting
their own intent for that of the legislature in interpreting the
1975 amendments, courts across the nation threaten to create a
new standard for preemption in the securities industry. The
power to defend against a state law claim by invoking the phrase
"National Market System," despite the fact that neither Congress
nor the SEC has contemplated the issue at hand, sets a danger-
ous precedent and restricts the states' ability to protect their citi-
zens by challenging dubious corporate activity.
